This study examined the hypothesis that differences in the cultural norms of Anglo-Americans and three other ethnic groups-Asian, Hispanic, and Black Americans-will result in different behaviors on a group task. Student subjects were assigned to ethnically diverse or allAnglo groups. Individual and group responses were measured using a Prisoner's Dilemma task in which participants could choose to compete or cooperate with another party. We hypothesized that groups composed of people from collectivist cultural traditions would display more cooperative hehavior than groups composed of people from individualistic cultural traditions. Results confirmed this hypothesis. Implications for future research and for organizations seeking to manage diversity are discussed.
The American work force is becoming increasingly diverse. Between now and the year 2000, 85 percent of the net additions to the work force will be women and nonwhite men, with Asian, Black, and Hispanic Americans and immigrants especially prevalent (Johnston & Packer, 1987) . Publication of information on these trends has led to calls for effective management of diversity in organizations, and commentators have advised that unless corporations start managing diversity, they will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage (Copeland, 1988; Nelton, 1988; Schmidt, 1988) . Moreover, invoking what might be termed the "value-in-diversity hypothesis," some writers have asserted that, when properly used, cultural diversity in work forces brings value to organizations and ultimately improves their performance. They have emphasized that managing diversity is an economic issue as well as a legal and social concern (Copeland, 1988; Cox & Blake, 1991; Esty, 1988; Sodano & Bailer, 1983) .
Despite these claims that cultural diversity may be beneficial to organizations, empirical investigations of the effects of cultural heterogeneity in organizations are virtually nonexistent (cf. Kanter, 1983) . A growing literature on organizational demography essentially ignores the dimension of race and ethnicity, focusing instead on age and tenure. This study addressed that deficit. A central theme of this study was that differences in cultural norms and values among ethnic groups in the United States will manifest themselves in different work-related behaviors. We believe that identifying those differences and their impacts on behavior is important because knowledge about the behavior of people in organizations has largely been built from studies of one ethnic group, Anglos.^ The extent to which this knowledge is applicable to organization members from other ethnic backgrounds has rarely been addressed. Therefore, there is a need for research that examines topics within the organization behavior domain witb data from ethnically diverse groups.
The present study addressed this research need by examining the effects of ethnic group differences between Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Anglos in an assessment of cooperative and competitive behavior on a group task.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
People of different ethnic backgrounds possess different attitudes, values, and norms that reflect their cultural heritages. One of tbe few areas of cultural difference that has been ratber extensively researched is tbe contrast between individualism and collectivism. In a study of value differences in 40 nations, Hofstede (1980) found that individualism-collectivism accounted for the greatest variance in work goal priorities of the dimensions be studied. Other cross-cultural researchers have also studied this polarity (for a review, see Triandis, 1989) . Compared to individualist cultures, collectivist cultures place greater emphasis on the needs and goals of the group, social norms and duty, shared beliefs, and cooperation witb group members (Triandis, 1989) . CoUectivists are more likely than individualists to sacrifice personal interests for the attainment of group goals (Bond & Wang, 1983) and are more likely to enjoy doing what the group expects of tbem (Bontempo, Lobel, & Triandis, 1990) .
Cross-cultural studies have shown that northern and western Europeans and North Americans tend to be individualists (Hofstede, 1980; Inkeles, 1983) and that Chinese people (Hsu, 1981) , other Asians, Latins, and most east and west Africans tend to be coUectivists (Abrahams, 1983; Hofstede, 1980; Kwasi, 1980) . There is also evidence that Hispanic (Kagan, 1977; Marin & Triandis, 1985; Triandis, Marin, Hui, Lisansky, & Ottati, 1984) and ' We use the term Anglos to refer to people who are racially white and of European descent.
Far Eastern minorities in the United States (Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990) tend to be collectivists. In addition, values linked to our definition of collectivism have been reported for Black Americans. Specifically, a group orientation and sense of community distinguish Black culture (Foeman & Pressley, 1987; Kochman, 1981] , and values of cooperation, mutual assistance, and altruism derive from the strong religious beliefs found in the Black community (Washington, 1987) .
Thus, previous research has indicated that individualism-collectivism is an important dimension of cultural difference in nations in which various ethnic groups of the United States have historical roots. In general, Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks have roots in nations with collectivist traditions, whereas Anglos have roots in the Euro-Anglo tradition of individualism. Moreover, the research reviewed above on North Americans shows that there has been some carryover of these traditions among the most strongly represented ethnic groups in the U.S. work force.
The collectivist value orientation has been found to be manifested in a variety of phenomena-the strong role of family, for instance, and the prevalence of personalism over achievement (Triandis, 1989) . However, our interest here is in the link between collectivism and cooperative behavior. In a test of convergent validity, collectivism was found to converge with cooperation on the Rokeach value survey and the Johnson cooperation scale (Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985) . Diaz-Guerrero (1984) found that collectivists emphasize the value of cooperation, whereas individualists emphasize competition. Leung (1988) found that collectivists prefer cooperative approaches like bargaining and mediation to conflict resolution. Finally, Wagner and Moch (1986) found that individualism-collectivism was related to job type. Collectivists tended to perform jobs that required teamwork and individualists performed more independent tasks. In addition, they found that collective rewards of work hold less appeal for individualists than for collectivists because such rewards must be shared rather than personally consumed.
In view of the cited research, we expected ethnic groups to differ vis-avis cooperation and competition. However, we wished to confirm this expectation with our data. Therefore, our first objective was to test the overall proposition that Asian, Black, and Hispanic individuals will display a more collectivist and cooperative orientation to a task than Anglos.
Previous research on the relationship between characteristics of individual members and group task performance has indicated that team creativity (Triandis, Bass, Ewen, & Mikesell, 1963) and performance on cognitive and dexterity tasks (Comrey, 1953; Wiest, Porter, & Chiselli, 1961) often reflect the individual creativity and problem-solving prowess of the team's members. We were interested in determining if this phenomenon would also hold for cooperation behavior. We were specifically interested in whether the ethnic differences in collectivist-cooperative orientation to a task present at an individual level would translate into different behaviors for ethnically diverse and all-Anglo task teams. We reasoned that one effect of having diverse groups in organizations composed of people with these cultural backgrounds might he to increase an intergroup cooperative approach to work and diminish the norm of individualistic competition that might he expected in all-Anglo groups. Therefore, if the differences predicted in our preliminary proposition were confirmed at the individual level, we would test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Presented with a choice of behaving cooperatively or competitively, groups composed of Asian, Black, Hispanic, and AngJo individuals will act cooperatively more often than groups composed soleJy of Anglos. Hypothesis 1 describes our general expectation of how ethnic differences will affect hehavior on a group task involving cooperation and competition. However, previous research on biculturalism and on situational ethnicity (Broch, 1987; Okamura, 1981; Paden, 1970; Salamone & Swanson, 1979) has suggested that situational cues may influence the manifestation of ethnic group differences.
A growing body of evidence supports the conclusion that members of the predominant minority groups of the United States tend to be bicultural and to have knowledge of Anglo norms as well as the norms of their own ethnic group. Previous theory and research has suggested that Blacks (Bell, 1986 (Bell, ,1990 Dubois, 1903; Thomas, 1990] , Hispanics (Garza, Romero, Cox, & Ramirez, 1982; Lugones & Spelman, 1983; Wong-Reiger & Quintana, 1987) , American Indians (McFee, 1968) , and Asians (Bond & Yang, 1982; WongReiger & Quintana, 1987) are typically hicultural. The extent to which Anglos are bicultural has rarely been studied; however, a recent study of Angloand Mexican Americans in Texas found that evidence of identification with both cultures was high among the latter but minimal among the Anglos (Hazuda, Stern, & Haffner, 1988) .
The term "situational ethnicity" refers to the idea that bicultural members of minority cultural groups may respond using norm sets from two different cultural backgrounds and that contextual cues may dictate which norm set is operative in a given situation. Paden wrote that "particular contexts may determine which of a person's communal identities or loyalties are appropriate at a point in time " (1970: 268) . Okamura (1981) added that the cognitive aspect of situational ethnicity is critical: individuals' perceptions and interpretations of the signs and symbols of a situation determine their hehavioral options.
Because of the prevalence of biculturalism among Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics and the importance of situational ethnicity, we believed that the responses of many memhers of those groups might be based on their knowledge of the competitive, majority-culture orientation rather than their cooperative, minority-culture orientation. Therefore, in addition to testing the general expectation stated in Hypothesis 1, we wanted to test the idea that Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics will increase their cooperative behavior under conditions that encourage their minority-group, collectivist-cooperative orientation. We reasoned that under neutral situational conditions the difference in response hetween Anglos and the other groups would be smaller than under conditions that increased the likelihood that the minorityculture orientation would he expressed.
Norms of competition and cooperation may both be present in some mixed-motive situations (Brickman, 1974) . In other words, individuals may he partly motivated to cooperate around common interests and partly motivated to compete for a large share of resources that must be divided up. These mixed-motive situations are simulated in mixed-motive games such as Prisoner's Dilemma (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Haggart, 1959) . Previous research on mixed-motive games (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977) has suggested that situational cues favorable to cooperative behavior may be established by creating a two-party cooperation-competition game in which feedback to one player on the other party's responses is manipulated to favor cooperation. Kuhlman and Marshello argued that people have tendencies to cooperate or compete in mixed-motive games and that these tendencies, or orientations, are stable. They also noted that the behavioral manifestations of these orientations have been found to vary with the characteristics of a situation, such as the hehavior of other actors. Both Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) and Kelley and Stahelski (1970) , using variations on the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm, found that cooperatively oriented subjects responded in kind to a competitive strategy but readily reverted to cooperative behavior in response to a cooperative strategy even though the payoff matrix for the game provided higher incentives for responding competitively. Individualistically oriented subjects, on the other hand, displayed competitive behavior under hoth conditions. The competitive behavior of the competitively oriented subjects was apparently a defensive strategy when the other party competed and an exploitation strategy when the other party cooperated hecause the payoff matrix was so structured that this combination produced advantages for the party who acted competitively. Sermat and Gregovich (1966) reported similar results using "chicken," a mixed-motive game that simulates two drivers racing toward each other to see who will "chicken out" first and pull aside. In view of the research reviewed here on biculturalism, situational ethnicity, and mixedmotive games, we predicted that the more cooperatively oriented ethnic groups-Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics-would have a stronger tendency to act cooperatively in situations in which they expected cooperation from other groups. We expected task conditions to influence both the relationship between ethnicity and cooperation predicted in our initial proposition and the relationship between the ethnic composition of groups and cooperation predicted in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, Hypothesis 2a: Under task conditions in which cooperative behavior is expected from others, Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics wiJ] tend to increase their level of cooperative behavior and Anglos will not. Hypothesis 2b: Under task conditions in which cooperative behavior is expected from others, diverse groups composed of Asians, Blacks, AngJos, and Hispanics wil] tend to increase their JeveJ of cooperative behavior, and AngJo-onJy groups wiJJ not.
METHODS

Subjects
Subjects were 136 graduate and undergraduate students from several academic majors who attended a large public university in the midwestern United States. There were 75 Anglo-Americans, 25 Asian Americans, 17 Black Americans, and 19 Hispanic Americans. Chinese Americans were the most prominent group among the Asians, and Mexican Americans were the most prominent group among the Hispanics. There were 95 men and 41 women. One hundred fifteen subjects were native-born Americans. We obtained no information on the number of generations of their families that had lived in America. Among the 21 subjects born outside the United States, the average length of time in this country was 12 years, and 18 of the 21 had lived here for more than 10 years.
Subjects were paid volunteers and were contacted by several methods: form letters sent to members of several student organizations, announcements in organization behavior classes, and letters placed in the mailboxes of students in the law, engineering, and business schools of the university. The written and verbal announcements invited students to participate in a two-to-three-hour-long research project on group dynamics.
Anglo subjects were randomly assigned to a group that was either ethnically diverse or all-Anglo. All non-Anglo subjects were randomly assigned to ethnically diverse groups. To the extent possible, we assigned one member from each ethnic group, including Anglo, to the diverse groups to minimize pressure to conform to the norms of a dominant group. All the diverse groups had one Anglo and three non-Anglos. One all-Anglo group had three members and one had five members; all the others had four. In total, we obtained data from 17 ethnically diverse groups and 16 all-Anglo groups. We tried to assign subjects so as to have comparable gender compositions in the mixed ethnicity and all-Anglo groups; however, because of a slight gender imbalance, a fully comparable distribution of men and women across groups was not achieved. Of the ethnically diverse groups, 9 had two men and two women, and the other 8 were all men. There were also 8 all-male groups among the Anglos, but only 4 of the remaining 8 groups were balanced on gender. We therefore did an analysis of variance to determine whether gender had a significant effect on cooperative behavior. Since this analysis indicated no significant effect of gender, the lack of complete parallelism in gender composition should not have affected our results.
Task
The task we employed to assess both individual and group response was a two-party Prisoner's Dilemma. In the two-party version of Prisoner's Dilemma, each party is faced with two choices represented by alphabetic characters. For example, the first party must chose A or B and the second party must chose X or Y. Numerical "payoffs" are assigned to the combinations of choices such that a two-by-two matrix is created. The matrix is specified in such a way that whether a given choice by one party yields a positive payoff depends on the other party's choice.^ Previous research on cooperative behavior has used this game extensively (Komorita, 1987; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Radlow, 1965; Uejio & Wrightsman, 1967; Van-Lange, Liebrand, & Kuhlman, 1990] . In researching the literature on Prisoner's Dilemma games, we discovered that Dawes (1980) argued that the two-person version of the game was less representative of real-world social dilemmas than the N-party game involving more than two parties. At least two other articles (Komorita, 1987; Messick & Brewer, 1983} have referred to Dawes's arguments. We used a two-party game in this study, however, and are confident of the validity of our decision for the following reasons: (1) Despite Dawes's concerns, the two-party game remains at least as popular in research as the N-party version. Although Komorita and Van-Lange and colleagues (1990) chose to focus on the N-party game, other recent researchers have employed the twoparty game (e.g., McCallum et al., 1985; Pruitt, 1967) . (2] Komorita found that his results with the N-party game supported Pruitt's (1967] findings with the two-party game and therefore noted that the difference in games was not important to the variables under study. (3) Previous writers on Prisoner's Dilemma seem to have agreed that the underlying dynamics of the game, in the form that we used it, contrasts cooperation and competition, and recently Van-Lange and colleagues explained the game in exactly the terms that we wished to use it here, as a behavioral manifestation of the difference between collectivists and individualistic orientations: "One of the most thoroughly studied forms of social interdependence is the Prisoner's Dilemma, which Kahan (1974) describes as arising from two conflicting definitions of rationality, one individualistic and the other collective. . . . Individual rationality prescribes noncooperation; irrespective of others' behavior. . . . Collective rationality prescribes cooperation. . . . " (1990: 35) . Figure 1 shows the decision choices and payoff matrix used in the game as played in this study. This version of the game has been popular in recent university teaching and research (Lau & Jelinek, 1984) .
As shown in Figure 1 , a cooperative response by both parties results in a moderate mutual gain. Nonetheless, a cooperative choice is risky because if the other party does not cooperate, the cooperator will suffer a large losŝ More detail on the two-party version of Prisoner's Dilemma is available in Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) . and the competitor will realize a large gain. If neither party cooperates, both suffer a moderate loss. In order to simulate a real-world work environment in which work groups in a firm compete for resources but depend on each other to accomplish work, we told subjects in each group to work under the following assumptions: (1) all participants were members of the same class, (2) the other party in their game was another group participating in the experiment with whom they might have to collaborate on work in the future, and (3) the payoffs were extra credit points that would be applied to the final class ranking for grading purposes. No instruction was given about what the objective of the game should be. Previous research on the game has suggested that for most groups, the competitive strategy appears optimal, particularly in the absence of feedback about the other party's behavior (Kahn, Hottes, & Davis, 1971) . It is important to note, however, that in nearly all the previous research, subjects were of only one ethnic group, Anglo. As implied previously, one objective here was to examine whether or not the competitive strategy would also appear optimal to groups of alternative ethnic compositions.
Two conditions of the game were employed: a no-feedback condition and a cooperative-feedback condition. For each condition, there were ten rounds of choices. We manipulated conditions to test our prediction that differences in cooperative behavior between the diverse and all-Anglo groups would increase when group members expected cooperation from the other party (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) . In the initial rounds of the game, the no-feedback condition, we made expectations of response from the other party neutral by providing no information about the other party's responses. Subjects simply decided on their strategies, selecting A or B individually and then in their teams. Before the cooperative-feedback rounds, we told subjects that the other party (party 2) had selected cooperative choices for all ten rounds during the no-feedback phase and that previous research on Prisoner's Dilemma suggested they could expect the other party to continue to cooperate. In reality, we contrived the responses-there was no other party.
Procedures
All data were collected during a single session. Upon arrival for the experiment, each subject received a packet containing the research questionnaires and response forms for individual responses on Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were assigned to groups on the basis of self-descriptions of ethnicity elicited by a questionnaire. Each group received a group response sheet and was assigned to a separate work area. In the work area, an experimenter read the instructions from a standard script.
While seated together in their groups, but before beginning group discussion of the task, subjects chose and recorded individually their strategies for all of the first ten rounds. They were also asked to record the reasons for their choices in their own words. The objective of the second request was to obtain another measure of cooperative or competitive orientation to the task and information for a manipulation check on the no-feedback and cooperative-feedback conditions.
After their members had recorded their individual choices for the first ten rounds, the groups were given eight minutes to discuss and reach consensus on strategies for all ten rounds at once. During this time, the subjects knew nothing of the choices made by the other party. When this period was over, an experimenter checked that each group had recorded choices for ten rounds and then gave the contrived feedback about the other party's choices. The spatial separation of groups was such that no group knew what feedback any other group had received. The subjects then played another ten rounds in the same manner, first choosing responses individually and then making consensual choices.
Another option in Prisoner's Dilemma is to have the subjects discuss the strategy for each round, record the decisions, then discuss the next round. We rejected this format because we did not believe that it would add value to the experiment. We wanted to compare feedback and no-feedback conditions to test Hypothesis 2 and wanted the game to be as similar as possible in other respects in the two conditions. Furthermore, repeatedly moving individuals into a group format and then back to making individual choices can enhance group influence on individual decisions.
Measures
Following Uejio and Wrightsman (1967) , we used the total number of cooperative responses for each of the ten rounds as our primary measure of cooperation. In addition, the reasons that individual subjects gave for their personal choices were analyzed and blind-coded independently for both competitive and cooperative themes. A reason could have both cooperative and competitive elements. Cooperative themes included mentioning consideration of mutual benefits or a desire to cooperate, even if some degree of protection was also seen as necessary. Competitive themes included mentioning seeking maximum gain, pursuing a strategy of winning or "going in the hole together," and choosing a cooperative strategy initially to gain the trust of the other party so as to subsequently exploit them.
Two measures of a collectivist, cooperative orientation were employed. First, all subjects completed a 14-item questionnaire designed to measure individualism-collectivism. The questionnaire items were taken from work on collectivism by Triandis and colleagues (1986) and Hui (1988) . Subjects indicated the extent of their agreement with the items on a seven-point Likert-type scale. Two examples of the items are: (1) "When faced with a difficult problem on the job, it is better to decide what to do yourself, rather than follow the advice of others" and (2) "One generally does better working alone than in a group." The second measure was the number of cooperative responses on Prisoner's Dilemma that subjects made individually before they had group discussion.
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
To determine whether the subjects were convinced by the information that the other parties had made cooperative choices during the no-feedback rounds of the game, we examined the reasons they gave for their individual choices during the cooperative-feedback rounds. The reasons 82 percent of the subjects gave indicated a belief that the other team would continue to cooperate. For example, they said that trust had been established and they would therefore act accordingly, or they said that since their partner was going to cooperate, they should take advantage of them. The remaining subjects did not give any reasons, said they used a random response strategy, or gave reasons that were undecipherable. Thus, it appeared that under the cooperative-feedback condition most subjects based their decisions at least in part on the expectation that their partners would continue to cooperate. In contrast, the majority (73%) of the reasons given in the no-feedback phase simply related to winning or losing and did not refer to an expectation of cooperation from the other party.
Analyses
Our initial proposition predicts that Asian, Black, and Hispanic individuals will display a more collectivist, cooperative orientation to the task than will Anglos. Mean scores on the individualism-collectivism scale were 56.75 for Asians, 58.80 for Blacks, 57.86 for Hispanics, and 56.49 for Anglos; higher numbers indicate a collectivist orientation. "Pairwise" comparisons of the means (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985) revealed that all differences are in the predicted direction; however, none of the contrasts reached statistical significance. The reliability of this measure of collectivist-cooperative orientation in terms of coefficient alpha was a very low .41. Because of the low reliability of the scale, we gave more emphasis to our second measure of collectivist-cooperative orientation, which was the number of cooperative game strategy choices individuals made prior to group discussion. Our basic proposition received additional support from the analysis of the reasons given for the individual, before-group-discussion choices. For this analysis, we singled out subjects who gave reasons that were either exclusively competitive-for instance, they referred to winning-or exclusively cooperative: they referred to mutual gain. Under the no-feedback condition, 51 percent (N = 69) gave such responses, and under the cooperativefeedback condition, 63 percent (N = 83) did so. Of these subjects, 82 percent (N = 45) of the Anglos gave competitively oriented responses under thê We used the effect size d when reporting differences between two groups, calculating it as 2tl\/dj, where / is the result of a f-test and df'is degrees of freedom. We used the effect size r when reporting differences between more than two groups (Cohen, 1977) , calculating it as ' ^} denominator no-feedback condition, as compared to 73 percent (N = 20) of the Asians, 60 percent (N = 9) of the Blacks, and 70 percent (N = 9) of the Hispanics. During the cooperative-feedback phase, 84 percent of the Anglos gave competitive reasons as compared to 63 percent of the Asians, 57 percent of the Blacks, and 33 percent of the Hispanics. Pairwise tests of differences between proportions (Ferguson, 1966) showed that the proportion of Anglos giving competitive responses was significantly greater than the proportion of individuals from other ethnic groups doing so (all p < .01). Furthermore, the percentage of people giving competitive rationales declined in the cooperative-feedback condition for all the ethnic groups except the Anglos.
Since the overall data confirmed our predictions about ethnic differences at an individual level,'* we were next interested in whether or not these cultural differences would affect behavior on a group task that was related to this difference. Table 2 presents the mean number of group cooperative responses for group composition by feedback condition and the results of an ANOVA of group by task condition. To test Hypothesis 1, we analyzed the group-level data with a two-by-two (ethnic composition by feedback condition) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the second factor. Hypothesis 1 predicts that ethnically diverse groups will make more cooperative choices than groups composed of all Anglos.
The ANOVA results given in Table 2 show a significant main effect for group type. As predicted, the ethnically diverse groups made significantly more cooperative choices than the groups composed solely of Anglos (F^ 3= 12.63, p < .001, d = 1.28). Therefore, the data support Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2a predicts that Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics will increase levels of cooperative response when they expect others to cooperate, whereas Anglos will not. In Table 1 , the interaction term for ethnicity by task condition is significant (F3 132 = 2.70, p < .05). A planned comparison showed that Anglos gave fewer cooperative responses when they expected cooperative responses from the other party, but individuals from all the other ethnic groups gave more cooperative responses under this task condition (Fj 132 = 4.42, p < .05, d = 0.37) . This result supports Hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 2b predicts that the difference between the diverse groups and groups composed solely of Anglo-Americans will increase under conditions that suggest that a cooperative norm is appropriate. This hypothesis was tested with the group-composition-by-task-condition interaction effect.
•* Previous work on individualism-collectivism has shown it to be a difficult construct to measure directly. Two reasons for this difficulty are the problem of measurement equivalence in cross-cultural research (Triandis, Malpass, & Davidson, 1973) and the multidimensional nature of the construct (Schwartz, 1990; Wagner & Moch, 1986) . In view of these problems, Triandis and colleagues (1973) suggested that cross-cultural differences in collectivism are best substantiated by patterns of relationships among variables rather than by mere differences in means on questionnaire responses. In this case, the direction of means on the collectivism scale, the ethnic group responses in Prisoner's Dilemma, and the reasons given for game responses formed a consistent pattern that suggests a more collectivist-cooperative value orientation for Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics than for Anglos. Scores ranged from 0 to 10. N's were respectively 16 and 17 for the two group types. * p < .10 ** p < .001
The means were in the predicted direction, but the effect was only marginally significant (p = .06). Although it failed to reach conventional levels of significance, the size of the effect (d = 0.70], was medium to large (Cohen, 1977) , and the level of significance was very close to the conventional standard for alpha, despite the relatively small number of cases. In addition, it should be noted that under tbe cooperative-feedback condition, the difference in tbe numbers of cooperative responses tbe etbnically diverse and all-Anglo groups made was quite large in absolute terms; the mean was 7.06 out of 10 for tbe diverse groups versus just 2.5 for tbe all-Anglo groups.
DISCUSSION
Tbis study provides empirical evidence tbat etbnic group differences affect at least some aspects of behavior in task groups. Tbe study found tbat at an individual level, Asian, Black, and Hispanic individuals bad a more collectivist-cooperative orientation to a task tban Anglo individuals. Tbis finding is consistent witb previous research and tbeory suggesting tbat these differences originate from differences in tbe national cultures in wbicb tbe various groups bave cultural roots. Tbis conclusion is consistent witb crossnational as well as U.S. etbnic group researcb on individualismcollectivism. We furtber found tbat we could draw on knowledge of tbis individual-level difference to predict differences in group bebavior on a group decision-making task. Specifically, etbnically diverse groups composed of Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Anglos acted more cooperatively tban all-Anglo groups, and tbose bebavioral differences tended to increase wben tbe situational cues favored cooperation. Tbese findings bave implications for tbe practice of management and for future researcb.
Since tbe non-Anglo etbnic groups studied bere are tbe tbree largest such groups in the U.S. population, and since the work force will increasingly be composed of members of these groups in the future, the behavior differences we found may have a significant impact on how work is done in organizations. The findings suggest that one effect of the presence of Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks in organizations may be to influence those organizations to take a more cooperative approach to work than has been prevalent. A review of recent literature citing leaders of many top-performing U.S. organizations such as United Hospitals Corporation, Digital Equipment Corporation, Ceneral Foods Corporation, and Texas Instruments indicates that cooperative work behavior is increasingly viewed as necessary to improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms (Bassin, 1988; Calagan, 1986; Hatcher & Ross, 1985; Levine, 1987; Markowich, 1987; Raudsepp, 1988; Scott & Cotter, 1984) . There is a caveat to the conclusion that increased hiring of Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics may move organizations toward a more cooperative approach to work. Although these etbnic groups acted more cooperatively than Anglos, the predominant response of all the groups expressed in both decisions and in tbe reasons given for decisions in tbe no-feedback rounds was competitive. It is useful to interpret this finding in ligbt of two findings from tbe feedback condition. First, tbe Anglos were tbe only group to become more competitive wben tbey expected cooperation from tbe otber party. Second, there were differences in normative responses at tbe group level of analysis, witb tbe bomogeneous Anglo groups selecting tbe cooperative cboice only 25 percent of tbe time compared to over 70 percent for tbe ethnically diverse groups. Acculturation and biculturalism may explain tbis combination of results. As discussed earlier, minority group members are often bicultural in tbat tbey are knowledgeable about and identify witb norm and value systems from tbe majority Anglo culture as well as tbose from tbeir minority culture group. Botb previous research and tbe current effort bave established tbat tbe Anglo norm for tbis game is to select tbe competitive response. Since nearly all tbe Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks were native-born Americans, we can expect some degree of assimilation to tbe Anglo norm to bave been present and tbat tbe bicultural subjects were aware of botb a competitive, majority culture and a cooperative, minority culture norm for approacbing tbe game. Tbus, tbe competitive reactions of tbe majority of Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks in tbe initial rounds could reflect tbe effects of assimilation to tbe Anglo norm. Tbe fact tbat tbese groups bad more inclination toward cooperation tban tbe Anglos indicates tbat tbe subcultural norm was operative for significant numbers of Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics. Tbe sbift toward cooperation wben feedback was provided for individuals in all groups except tbe Anglos suggests tbat members of tbe minority culture groups were more likely to display tbeir subcultural group norm wben tbey expected it to be reciprocated. Finally, tbe stronger manifestation of tbe cooperative norm at tbe group level of analysis tban at tbe individual level migbt reflect reinforcement of tbat norm by otber members of tbe group wbo were also from minority culture backgrounds. Tbus, tbe bigbest incidence of tbe minority culture cooperative orientation occurred under conditions most favorable to tbe expression of tbat norm, wben individuals expected tbat tbe otber party would cooperate and not exploit tbem in tbe game, and otbers from backgrounds witb collectivist, cooperative norms were in tbe group.
Anotber important implication of our findings on cooperating in tbe game for cooperative bebavior in work settings concerns bow group boundaries are defined. Triandis (1989) suggested tbat collectivists tend to apply cooperative norms cbiefly to otber parties defined as witbin tbeir in-group. In-groups are composed of individuals wbo sbare norms, goals, and values and are contrasted witb out-groups, individuals viewed as dissimilar or as baving norms, goals, and values unrelated to tbose of tbe in-group.
As previously explained, our experiment was designed to simulate two interdependent groups wbose members viewed tbemselves as subpopulations of tbe same organization. Wbetber our data are consistent witb tbose of Triandis depends on bow tbe subjects defined in-group boundaries. We bave no specific information on tbis, but tbe results suggest tbat tbe individuals and groups wbose orientations tended to be collectivist-cooperative may bave defined tbeir in-group more broadly tban tbose witb more competitive orientations, seeing it as including otber members of tbe same class, even tbougb tbey were not in tbeir specific task team. We so interpret tbe findings because tbe payoff matrix is sucb tbat tbe cooperative response only seems rational if people define tbe goal of tbe game as maximizing tbe combined outcome of tbe parties and not simply tbe outcome affecting tbemselves. Tbis interpretation of our results is consistent witb Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) tbeory regarding tbe prediction of cooperative responses in Prisoner's Dilemma. Tbey argued tbat cooperation will only be bigb wben a party (1) defines tbe goal of tbe game as acbieving mutual cooperation and (2) expects cooperation from tbe otber party. In tbe second pbase of our game, people expected cooperation from tbe otber party and, tiierefore, would bave been likely to respond cooperatively if tbey defined tbe goal as mutual cooperation, or maximizing joint outcomes.
Since a rougb parallel to our groups in an organizational setting would be two different departments or divisions of tbe same company, groups sbaring an organizational affiliation but vying for allocations of limited resources, our experiment contrasts cooperation and competition in a way tbat is relevant to organizations. However, our researcb was limited to looking at cooperative bebavior between groups, and we did not address intragroup cooperativeness. Therefore, an avenue for future researcb is examination of tbe effects of cultural diversity on intragroup cooperative bebavior.
Tbe results for tbe tests of Hypotbeses 2a and 2b were most intriguing. We predicted that tbe etbnic group differences in cooperative behavior would increase wben participants expected cooperative bebavior from tbe otber party. Tbe weigbt of tbe evidence supports tbis prediction. Our tbeory was based on our ideas about task cues, situational etbnicity, and biculturalism. We argued tbat many members of etbnic minorities are bicultural and tberefore identify to some extent witb botb tbe dominant culture's compet-itive norm and tbe minority culture's cooperative norm. By manipulating the game, we created situational cues in tbe second pbase tbat sbifted members of etbnic minorities from a dominant cultural norm to tbeir minority cultural norm. Since tbe incidence of biculturalism among tbe Anglos was expected to be low and tbere was unlikely to be an alternative norm set to wbicb tbey could sbift, tbe situational etbnicity pbenomenon sbould not bave affected tbem. Tbe implication for management is tbat situational cues in an organizational context will be important in determining tbe extent of tbe expression of etbnic minority norms in predominantly Anglo organizations. To tbe extent tbat organizations value diverse points of view, tbe organizational climate must be sucb tbat people witb perspectives tbat diverge from tbe dominant culture feel free to express tbem.
Anotber possible interpretation of tbe results for Hypotbeses 2a and 2b is tbat tbe groups composed of Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Anglos were more likely tban tbe Anglo-only groups to define tbe objective of tbe game as maximizing joint outcomes and not as beating tbe otber party. Sucb an interpretation would be entirely consistent witb tbe collectivist value orientation ascribed bere to Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics.
Tbis study bas a number of limitations tbat future researcb sbould address. First, our results address only one cultural difference and one bebavioral manifestation of a collectivist orientation. As Wagner and Mocb (1986) suggested, more researcb using cultural differences on tbe individualismcollectivism dimension could contribute to models of leadersbip, job design, and team building. Furtber, investigation of a broader spectrum of cultural differences and relevant work force bebaviors is necessary, as is better utilization of tbe existing researcb in tbe fields of sociology, psycbology, and antbropology as a basis for tbeory construction in organizational researcb.
Second, our researcb suggested tbe importance of biculturalism and situational etbnicity but did not test tbese effects. Future researcb sbould explore tbe notions of biculturalism and situational etbnicity more directly. For example, it would be useful to know more about tbe types of situational cues biculturals use to select eitber a minority or a majority norm set for response. Also, researcb is needed tbat clarifies tbe amounts of variance witbin etbnic groups on biculturalism and bow different etbnic identity profiles affect bebavior.
A tbird limitation is tbat tbe etbnically diverse groups in tbis experiment bad equal representation of tbe etbnic categories studied. In workplaces, bowever, representation is typically less balanced, and decisions are made in tbe context of an organizational culture. Using a balanced configuration, we avoided tbe typical situation in wbicb minority culture members conform to majority Anglo norms and tbus facilitated our objective of uncovering etbnic group differences. At tbe same time, tbe extent to wbicb our results are applicable to a more typical work group in wbicb Anglos predominate migbt be questioned. Our researcb demonstrates tbe potential for people to take different approacbes to a task on tbe basis of etbnic differences, but we make no claim tbat tbis potential will be manifested in groups witb bigbly skewed etbnic profiles. Kanter's (1977) researcb sbowed tbe dysfunctional effects of bigbly skewed group identity profiles and suggested tbe importance of acbieving a "critical mass" representation of minority groups in order to mitigate tbese effects. In a study using a game similar to Prisoner's Dilemma, Espinoza and Garza (1985) found tbat Hispanics acted more competitively wben tbeir representation was low tban wben it was bigb. Additional researcb is needed to clarify bow variations in tbe etbnic composition of groups influence tbe expression of dominant and minority group norms. If sucb researcb indicates tbat minority group density moderates differences in cooperation and competition between minority and majority group members in predominantly majority work groups, it will reinforce Kanter's conclusions about tbe importance of acbieving critical mass and avoiding token representation of minorities in work groups.
Finally, tbis study employed ad boc groups meeting for a single session. Tbe effects of etbnic diversity are likely to vary during a group's developmental stages. Some effects of diversity, sucb as tbe occurrence of stereotyping bebavior, may be strongest during tbe early stages of a group's life, when tbe pbysical differences between etbnic groups are very salient and otber sources of information are limited. Otber effects of diversity, sucb as creating a climate in wbicb diverse points of view are expressed, may not occur until tbe later stages of group development. Or perhaps tbe relationsbip between diversity and group life stage depends on a group's task. For example, it may be tbat tbe effect of etbnic diversity is greater in tbe early stages of group development only if tbe group task is related to etbnicity. Tbus, tbe saliency of etbnicity in group dynamics may be greater for a decision involving an affirmative action policy tban for a cooperationcompetition task. Tbese speculations cannot be addressed using tbe data presented bere, but tbey point to patbs for future studies.
Anotber researcb direction tbis study suggests is examination of tbe effects of etbnic bomogeneity and beterogeneity per se, independent of tbe specific etbnic groups represented. Tbe present study compared a particular type of bomogeneous group to a particular type of diverse group. Tbere is a need for studies addressing tbe differences between bomogeneity and beterogeneity more generally. Tbe existing literature on group beterogeneity effects contains very few studies tbat include etbnicity or race as a dimension of beterogeneity. One serious problem witb completing tbis type of researcb is obtaining enougb etbnic minority subjects for complete-cell researcb designs. Doing so is especially difficult in researcb tbat focuses on managers of organizations.
In conclusion, an important general implication of tbis researcb is tbat botb academics and practitioners sbould give more attention to identifying tbe potentially positive effects on organizational bebavior and effectiveness deriving from bebavioral differences associated witb non-Anglo cultures. Identifying tbese effects would be a vital first step toward establisbing truly multicultural organizations in wbicb tbe positive aspects of many cultures are accepted and incorporated and tbe value in diversity is recognized.
